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Abstract 
 
 
Biofuel subsidies in the United States have been justified on the following grounds: 
energy independence, a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, improvements in rural 
development related to biofuel plants, and farm income support. The 2007 energy act 
emphasizes the first two objectives. In this study, we quantify the costs and benefits that 
different biofuels provide. We consider the first two objectives separately and show that 
each can be achieved with a lower social cost than that of the current policy. Then, we 
show that there is no evidence to disprove that the primary objective of biofuel policy is 
to support farm income. Current policy favors corn production and the construction of 
corn-based ethanol plants. We find that favoring corn happens to be the best way to 
remove land from food and feed production, thus providing higher commodity prices and 
income to farmers and landowners. Next, we calculate two sets of alternative biofuel 
subsidies that are targeted to meeting income transfer objectives and either greenhouse 
gas emission reductions or fuel energy reductions. The first of these assumes that 
greenhouse gas emissions and high crop prices are joint objectives, and the second 
assumes that fuel independence and high crop prices are the joint objectives. Finally, we 
infer the social willingness to pay for biofuel services. This, in turn, allows us to propose 
a subsidy schedule that maintains (inferred) social preferences and provides a higher 
incentive for farmers to choose production of cellulosic materials. This is particularly 
relevant since the 2007 energy act sets a renewable fuels standard that relies heavily on 
cellulosic biofuel but does not specify a higher “per gallon” incentive to producers. 
 
Keywords: biofuels, biofuel subsidies, energy security, feedstock, greenhouse gas 
emissions, social preferences, value-added agriculture. 
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Implied Objectives of U.S. Biofuel Subsidies 
 
U.S. biofuel subsidies have been justified on at least four grounds. Two of the justifications 
pertain to positive externalities associated with reducing the need for U.S. oil imports and 
reducing carbon emissions. (See for example the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007.) The remaining two justifications are associated with rural development. The first of 
these is based on the economic activity associated with the construction and operation of 
biofuel facilities (Dorr, 2006), and the second is the stimulus that higher commodity prices 
provide to farm income (Tyner and Taheripour, 2007).  
 The purpose of this paper is to evaluate and compare the magnitude and sign of 
the four benefits that have been used to justify existing biofuel subsidies. We begin with 
the maintained hypothesis that existing subsidy levels are structured as they are as a result 
of a rational and informed policy-making process. By measuring the costs and benefits 
associated with the stated objectives, we can then infer the weights that policymakers 
likely placed on the four stated objectives. We then show that the existing subsidy 
structure is inconsistent with the first three justifications and explain how the structure 
would need to change to make it consistent with the first and second objectives, 
respectively. Then, we show subsidy schedules that support the first and fourth objective, 
and the second and fourth objective. Next, we infer the weights that policymakers may 
assign to some of the objectives to propose a schedule that also complies with social 
preferences. These results are particularly relevant because the 2007 energy act makes 
clear that policy changes are needed, and it provides specific direction for these changes. 
However, it does not actually change the existing market-based incentive structure in the 
way that is needed to achieve these new objectives. 
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 We begin by quantifying the gains from different biofuel production systems in 
terms of energy displacement and greenhouse gas emissions. We are greatly assisted in 
this process by the availability of a systems engineering model called GREET that has 
helped resolve some of the controversy surrounding the life cycle assessment (LCA) of 
energy and carbon balances associated with these systems. Then, we supplement the 
quantity measures available from this system with our computed associated measures of 
economic relevance. This allows us to compare the costs of reducing negative 
externalities via biofuels with that of the least-cost alternative of achieving the same 
reduction. Next, we examine biofuels policy in terms of the two rural development 
objectives discussed earlier. We then calculate the relative subsidies that would be 
needed to meet some of the specific goals in the 2007 energy act.  
 
U.S. Biofuel Subsidies 
The U.S. biofuels industry has benefited from financial support from the government in 
many forms. Arguably, the largest support is provided through the volumetric excise tax 
credit (usually known as the blenders credit) first introduced in 1978 through energy 
policy. The Energy Tax Act of 1978 represented a change in the direction of federal 
energy legislation. It was the first time that a government program shifted from 
promoting oil and gas to supporting production of fuel from renewable sources. This act 
provided a subsidy of $0.40 per gallon of ethanol blended at a rate of at least 10% and 
used as a motor fuel. The subsidy rate for ethanol has been adjusted several times in the 
last thirty years; it was set to $0.60 in the Tax Reform Act in 1984 and gradually 
decreased to its current rate of $0.51 in 2005. 
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 The blenders tax credit for biodiesel was initiated much later, through the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Since then, biodiesel blenders have been credited 
$1 per gallon of biodiesel from oilseeds or animal fat and $0.50 for biodiesel from 
recycled cooking oil.  
 A second stated objective for promoting biofuels is a reduction in the rate at which 
greenhouse gases (GHG) are emitted into the atmosphere. The legislation collectively 
referred to as the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 was the first environmental policy to 
have a significant effect on the supply of renewable energy. New oxygen requirement 
mandates of 2% were introduced to control for carbon emission. As a result, ethanol became 
widely used by gasoline producers. Recent diesel regulations for ultra-low-sulfur fuel were 
expected to increase biodiesel demand by blenders in the same fashion (Duffield and Collins, 
2006). However, recent usage levels seem to indicate that biodiesel is not the preferred 
additive of fuel suppliers under current market conditions. 
 The overall use of renewable fuel was labeled the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) 
for the first time in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The initial RFS specified minimum 
amounts of renewable fuel to be used each year, starting with 4 billion gallons in 2006 and 
raised in increments of 700 million gallons each year until 2012. This schedule was 
restructured in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The new schedule sets a 
renewable fuel volume of 9 billion gallons for 2008 and increases it annually to attain 36 
billion gallons in 2022. Each annual target is mandated by minimum levels of biofuel by type 
to be used. Conventional biofuels are defined as those derived from cornstarch and expected 
to gain 20% life cycle GHG emission reductions. Advanced biofuels are mainly cellulosic 
biofuels, sugarcane-based ethanol, and biomass-based diesel. All advanced biofuels are 
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expected to achieve GHG emission reductions of at least 50%. The rate at which the volume 
of conventional biofuels is planned to increase annually diminishes until it reaches 15 billion 
gallons in 2015. Advanced biofuels are scheduled to grow at an increasing rate, to account 
for 58% of overall renewable fuels in 2022. 
 
Biofuel Subsidies Motivated by Externalities 
The net energy and emission balances of biofuels, particularly corn-based ethanol, have 
been the focus of heated debate, with several studies finding seemingly opposite results. 
In a side-by-side comparison of representative analysis of corn-based ethanol, Farrell et 
al. (2006) found that scholars reporting negative energy balances tended to ignore co-
products or used obsolete data. Similar results are reported by Hill et al. (2006), who 
analyzed both corn-based ethanol and soy-based biodiesel. While the comparisons 
provided by Farrell et al. indicate that corn-based ethanol requires far less petroleum to 
produce energy than does gasoline, ethanol’s GHG emissions balance (as compared to 
that of gasoline) depends on the production process employed.  
 To capture the main differences across biofuels and production systems, we 
conducted a life cycle analysis of energy displacement (both petroleum and total fossil) 
and GHG emission reductions from an array of renewable sources using the GREET 
model.1 In particular, our analysis includes several of the biofuel pathways introduced in 
recent work by Wang, Wu, and Huo (2007) (table 1). These pathways include averages 
capturing the existing corn ethanol industry as well as several different types of new 
plants. These new plants are categorized based on their use of natural gas or coal and 
whether they dry the feed by-product before sale. Ethanol fuels based on cellulosic 
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materials such as switchgrass and corn stover are included as well as biodiesel produced 
from soybean oil. 
 Table 2 presents the amount of fossil energy needed to produce and consume a 
million British thermal units2 (mBtu) of energy, for both well-to-pump (WTP) and pump-
to-wheel (PTW) stages. WTP refers to the energy used by the upstream production 
process all the way to the pump. The PTW stage captures the fuel combustion during 
vehicle operation. While the energy in the PTW phase is all of fossil origin for gasoline 
and diesel, none of the energy consumed in this stage is sourced from fossil energy when 
biofuels are used.  
 To read table 2, start with the row labeled gasoline. The WTP number 225,641 
Btu/mBtu suggests that it takes about 225,641 Btu of fossil energy to remove 1 million 
Btu of energy (in the form of crude oil) from the ground, refine it, and transport it to the 
gas station. When this energy is then used to power the automobile, all 1,225,641 Btu of 
fossil energy are essentially used and eliminated. When we do the same analysis for an 
ethanol plant that dries its distiller’s grains with natural gas, the fossil energy cost 
associated with production of inputs, agricultural activities, feedstock transportation, 
producing the ethanol, and transporting the energy to the pump is 728,205 Btu per mBtu. 
When this mBtu of energy is used by the automobile, no additional fossil energy is used. 
In this sense it can be argued that ethanol has a positive energy balance and that ethanol 
uses 40.6% less fossil energy than gasoline.  
 Clearly, the highest reductions in fossil energy use are obtained with cellulosic 
ethanol, followed by biodiesel. Within corn-based ethanol production, differences exist 
based on the process fuel used and the co-products marketed. The average fossil energy 
6 
consumption of ethanol production is lower for ethanol plants that do not dry the co-
product before sale, and it is highest for coal-fired plants that do dry the co-product.   
 Current U.S. law provides the same $0.51-per-gallon credit for all ethanol 
regardless of the type of plant, source of input (corn or cellulose), and fossil energy used. 
Therefore, we can safely conclude that fossil energy savings was not the primary 
motivation for the existing subsidy structure. This is not a surprise because the 
motivations described earlier have typically emphasized a reduction in crude oil imports 
and not a reduction in fossil energy use. We have included this fossil energy analysis 
because it links the rest of our work to the energy balance controversy. 
 Table 3 presents the amount of petroleum energy needed to produce and consume 
1 mBtu of energy, with a breakout for the WTP and PTW phases. Ethanol and biodiesel 
are much more efficient in saving crude oil than they are in saving fossil energy. This is 
because much of the energy used to produce ethanol comes from coal used to make steel 
and natural gas. All the pathways analyzed would lead to about a 90% reduction in 
petroleum energy used when replacing gasoline or diesel with the comparable biofuel. 
Note that the petroleum energy displaced is similar for all ethanol production systems, 
which alone is consistent with the existing fixed U.S. ethanol subsidy structure. 
 The fuel pathways analyzed also differ in their effectiveness to reduce GHG 
emissions when substituting for gasoline or diesel. Table 4 indicates that while reductions 
in GHG emissions of almost 40% are possible with corn-based ethanol, the production of 
ethanol in coal-fired plants that market dried distillers grains with solubles (DDGS) does 
not provide GHG emission reduction benefits. As with the fossil fuel energy 
displacement measure, cellulosic ethanol and biodiesel perform better than corn-based 
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ethanol when GHG emission reductions are the target. Note the enormous differences 
across energy production systems. Had GHG emissions been the motivation for the 
existing subsidy structure, then the subsidy for coal-fired plants would have been much 
lower than for plants fired with natural gas that sell only wet distillers grains. 
 
Externalities Expressed on a Per Gallon Basis 
The results have been presented so far in terms of benefits per mBtu of energy produced 
and used. However, support is expressed by subsidies per gallon. To see the implications 
of the current subsidy structure more clearly, the benefits presented in tables 2 through 4 
are translated and expressed in this section on a “per gallon of biofuel” basis.  
 Table 5 reports the benefits in terms of LCA of fossil and petroleum energy savings 
and GHG emission reductions obtained by1 gallon of ethanol or biodiesel for the pathways 
analyzed to replace petroleum fuels. These results assume a low heating value energy 
content of 76,000 Btu per gallon of ethanol and 124,000 Btu per gallon of biodiesel. These 
results show that because of its higher energy density, biodiesel dominates across all 
categories. It is interesting to note that the subsidy level for biodiesel (currently $1.00 per 
gallon, or approximately twice the per-gallon subsidy level for ethanol) is almost in line 
with its relative energy savings. A small reduction in the biodiesel subsidy relative to the 
ethanol subsidy would bring the subsidy structure exactly in line.  
 
Cost of the Purchased Externality 
All of the foregoing results have been expressed in terms of the services provided per unit 
of energy or volume of biofuels produced and consumed. It is instructive to examine the 
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implications of the current subsidy structure in terms of the cost of the externality that is 
being purchased. These results are shown in table 6.  
 Fossil energy reduction is currently reimbursed at an average rate of $14.7 per 
mBtu, whereas the same reduction could have been bought at $10.4 per mBtu from a 
natural-gas-fueled plant that markets wet distillers grains with solubles (WDGS). The 
same energy displacement service would cost only $6.00 were cellulosic ethanol to 
become commercialized.  
 Current subsidies would imply that GHG emission reductions “cost” $350 per ton 
of carbon dioxide equivalent when purchased from the existing ethanol industry. 
However, natural gas plants marketing WDGS and cellulosic ethanol plants would 
provide the same benefit for a cost that is 50% and 77% lower, respectively. At the other 
extreme, coal-fired plants marketing DDGS would actually increase GHG emissions (or 
at least provide no reductions). As of early 2008, the current market price for one ton of 
carbon dioxide equivalent on the Chicago Climate Exchange was $1.90 per ton for 2010 
delivery.3 Notice, however, that this 2010 contract had an open interest of only 350,000 
tons. This low volume may underestimate the real value of GHG emission reduction 
because the United States has not introduced any cap on emissions. Nevertheless, there is 
a striking difference between the market value of carbon emission reductions and the 
current cost of the same reductions via biofuel subsidies. If the only motivation for 
biofuel subsidies was to reduce GHG emissions, then we could conclude that the 
purchase price of these emission reductions is approximately two hundred times the price 
available elsewhere. 
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 If we assume a one-for-one relationship between net fuel savings provided by 
biofuels and U.S. fuel imports, we can also get a sense of the costs of reducing our 
dependence on foreign oil via biofuels. These values are shown in the fourth column in 
table 6. The values show that it costs from $6 to $8 to reduce U.S. fuel imports by one 
million Btu. To put this value in perspective, the early 2008 value of a million Btu of 
natural gas on the New York Mercantile Exchange is in the range of $7 to $8 depending 
on the delivery month.4 These energy values were far lower when the current subsidy 
system was constructed. The market values for one million Btu from diesel and from 
gasoline did not exceed $8 until 2004, well after the current regulations were signed. This 
comparison suggests that the cost of reducing foreign oil imports is high—in fact, 
approximately equal to the market value of this product.  
 We can find an estimate of the cost of reducing the amount of imported oil by 
calculating what it would have cost to produce gasoline from the cheapest and most 
abundant U.S. energy source, coal. In 2001 the U.S. National Energy Laboratory 
commissioned a comprehensive study of the likely cost of production of ultra-clean fuels 
from coal via the “syngas” method (Gray and Tomlinson, 2001).5 This is the same 
production method used to produce fuel in Germany during the Second World War and in 
South Africa during trade restrictions associated with apartheid. The authors calculated 
that this method could produce fuel for $41.57 per barrel crude oil equivalent assuming 
full capture of all CO2. The authors also calculated that a Section 29 credit of $0.52 per 
mBtu would be sufficient to commercialize the technology given market expectations at 
that time. They also indicated that the coal reserves of the United States would be 
sufficient to supply these plants with enough coal to achieve energy independence. 
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Policymakers chose not to provide this $0.52/mBtu credit and instead chose to subsidize 
biofuels in the range of $6.00 to $8.00 per mBtu. This suggests that at the time the 
decision was made, the reduction in crude oil imports was not a primary objective. 
However, as we will show, if it is true that the additional cost of biofuel policies relative 
to green coal policies could be justified on the grounds of an income transfer to crop 
growers and land owners, then the current policy structure makes sense. 
 
Rural Development Associated with Biofuel Plants 
As described in Dorr 2006, a successful biofuel policy will also result in increased rural 
development through construction costs and the economic activity generated by the 
plants themselves. However, Miranowski et al. (2008) conclude that some of the corn 
feedstock that is used in ethanol plants will be made available through modest reductions 
in meat and dairy production, and particularly in reduced meat exports. They compare 
two scenarios, representing low and high ethanol prices, and show the job impacts by 
2016. Higher ethanol prices induce more ethanol production, and this creates 5,999 extra 
jobs.6 However, higher ethanol production is also associated with higher corn prices, and 
this causes a net job loss in the livestock sector in the range of 17,157 to 20,847. 
Unfortunately, this paper does not provide the indirect impact on jobs from reduced 
livestock production. It seems likely that once these indirect effects are taken into 
account, the job loss comparison would weigh even more heavily against ethanol 
production. This follows from the fact that meatpacking is a labor-intensive activity. The 
intuition behind the results obtained by Miranowski et al. is that livestock production is a 
labor-intensive way to add value to corn relative to ethanol production.   
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 The Miranowski et al. study evaluates neither the economic activity generated by 
increased crop and land prices nor the profit distributions from crop production and 
ethanol plants. In this sense, the authors may have missed the key contribution of the 
industry. We can, however, conclude that biofuel policy cannot be motivated solely on 
the economic activity of the plants themselves.  
 
Biofuel Subsidies as a Transfer to Crop Producers and Landowners 
The provision of fiscal incentives to ethanol and biodiesel producers can be translated 
into enhanced prices for different agricultural products as long as those incentives are 
sufficient to entice commercial investment in the plants. If the structure of incentives is 
such that the final profitability of a certain feedstock is increased relative to that of a 
competing crop, the subsidy will affect farm-level decisions in terms of land allocation 
and farm income. Hence, the structure of subsidies might promote a given crop, which 
will expand at the expense of other crops or idle land.  
 Secchi and Babcock (2007) have shown that increasing corn prices via ethanol 
will increase the opportunity cost of cropland and in so doing will increase the 
equilibrium price of all crops. This means that a successful biofuels policy will result in a 
predictable increase in revenues to crop producers and, eventually, landowners. With an 
inelastic demand for all crops taken together, any leftward shift in the food supply curve 
will have a significant and predictable price effect. 
 The largest and so far most obvious impact of U.S. biofuel policy has been the 
rapid increase in crop prices associated with the shift of a large number of acres out of 
food and feed production and into energy production, with the aid of high crude oil 
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prices. For example, the futures price for corn for delivery on the Chicago Board of Trade 
in December 2008 increased from $2.60 per bushel when the contract started trading in 
2006 to $4.97 in early 2008. The price for November 2008 soybeans increased from 
$6.50 to $11.89 during the same period. Prices for delivery in 2009 and 2010 have 
followed a similar pattern as it became obvious that higher energy prices coupled with 
existing biofuel policies would cause continued growth in biofuel production. About 15% 
of the price increase in both futures occurred after the signing of the 2007 energy act, 
suggesting that this act is also viewed as being a positive force for crop prices. 
 The fact that crop prices have grown with biofuel production does not prove that 
higher crop prices were caused by biofuels. However, Tokgoz et al. (2007) provide a very 
simple model that links crude oil prices and ethanol subsidies to corn prices in a way that 
has almost exactly replicated actual market behavior. In this model, crude oil prices and 
thus gasoline prices are exogenous. For a given gasoline price, the demand for ethanol is 
perfectly elastic at its energy value. A perfectly elastic demand implies that all of the 
blenders credit is transferred to the ethanol producer. Tokgoz et al. then calculate the 
break-even corn price and assume that ethanol production will increase until this price is 
reached.  
 Storage arbitrage in the corn futures market is important. Any anticipated increase 
in the future demand for ethanol will be reflected in the corn futures prices. Additionally, 
any increase in the corn futures prices for contracts in the distant future will usually 
translate into an increase in prices for nearby futures and for cash. In the corn market, 
with storage arbitrage the cash price of corn will rise to the breakeven price, less storage 
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costs. In this model, the $0.51 blenders credit effectively increases the per bushel price of 
corn by $1.42 per bushel as long as this credit is expected to continue.  
 The supply of biofuels, on the other hand, is bounded in this model. Land is a 
scarce input, and high demand drives feedstock producers to less-advantaged soils to 
increase volume of production. Hence, farmers face a production function that has 
decreasing returns to scale (DRTS). Several recent real-world examples support this 
argument. First, we observe that acres outside of the Corn Belt, which are less suitable for 
growing corn, shift to corn in almost every state. Second, we see farmers moving away 
from a soybean-corn rotation to continuous corn in spite of yield penalties associated 
with this shift. Lastly, less-productive land that was previously chosen to be in the 
Conservation Reserve Program is moving back into corn production because of its higher 
profitability (Feng, Rubin, and Babcock, 2008). As long as farmers are free to choose 
between crops in their rotation, the increase in corn prices will be translated into growth 
in all crop prices. 
 With a DRTS production function (or upward-sloping supply curve) of feedstocks 
and an infinitely elastic demand function for the biorefinery, we can conclude that any 
exogenous increase in fuel prices or/and a unit subsidy will be captured entirely into 
feedstock producers’ or landowners’ surplus in the long run. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between ethanol and corn production. In 2007, 
the increase in corn production almost matched the increase in the capacity of the ethanol 
industry. However, plants that are under construction are expected to double the capacity 
of the industry. 
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 This data and price changes that have been observed on futures markets suggest that 
biofuel policy, coupled with high energy prices, has removed and will continue to remove 
land from food and feed production. In so doing, it has increased returns to crop growers, and 
landowners eventually will also see these returns. The next question we need to ask is 
whether current policy appears to have been designed with this outcome in mind. 
 Given conversion rates of biofuels, the associated long-run revenue increase per 
acre due to the tax blenders credit can be established for each feedstock. Since a fixed 
payment per gallon would result in all corn-based ethanol plants receiving the same 
subsidy per unit of corn utilized in ethanol production (assuming all plants achieve the 
same yield of 2.8 gallons per bushel), we do not distinguish between energy sources used 
at the refinery stage in this section. Hence, we will consider only four feedstocks for 
biofuel production: corn, soybeans, corn stover, and switchgrass. 
 Table 7 shows that under the current policy, cornstarch receives a much higher 
subsidy on a per-acre basis than any other feedstock. Notice that the payments per acre to 
cornstarch are more than three times the payments expected for soybean acreage. They also 
exceed payments that would be provided to cellulosic materials by between 20% and 280%. 
This might explain in part the results of a study by Tokgoz et al. (2007), which concluded 
that as long as producers can choose between switchgrass for ethanol, soybeans for biodiesel, 
and corn for ethanol, they will choose to grow corn. Moreover, if the economic terms are 
such that farmers have incentives to haul and sell corn stover, the subsidy per corn acreage 
reaches $275.6 and the tendency to favor corn becomes even higher.  
 The current subsidy structure therefore seems to be tilting the scale in favor of 
corn production, and as long as this subsidy structure remains in place, corn will be the 
15 
preferred source of biofuels. The 2007 energy act implicitly recognizes this issue by 
mandating the blending of 15 billion gallons of conventional biofuels, 16 billion gallons 
of cellulosic biofuels and 1 billion gallons of biodiesel by 2022. Had the framers of the 
act been satisfied with the existing incentive structure, they would not have provided 
separate mandates for corn and cellulosic ethanol. The energy act does not, however, 
provide for any change in credits or subsidies designed to bring about this change. This 
data suggests that current U.S. biofuel policy is consistent with the objective of 
increasing returns to crop growers and eventually to landowners. If this is a true 
objective, we can ask why the policy favored corn over soybeans. To answer that 
question, we gathered the required data to reconstruct profit margins of corn-based 
ethanol and soy-oil-based biodiesel over time. Prices for the biofuels were reconstructed 
based on their energy value, according to the fuel each would replace. Figure 2 presents 
profit margins based on historical data of feedstock, fuel, and co-products prices of a dry 
milling ethanol plant and biodiesel refinery. The industries’ processing costs are assumed 
to be $0.40 and $0.30 per gallon of ethanol and biodiesel, respectively. This assumption 
is drawn from numerous peer studies that review biofuels production costs (for example, 
Paulson and Ginder, 2007; Gallagher and Shapouri, 2005). (Supporting material for 
figure 2 can be provided by the authors upon request.) 
 Noticeably, ethanol production was closer to being viable than biodiesel on the 
period of policy adjustments. While a subsidy of $0.51 per gallon of ethanol generates 
positive profits for the blender in most periods and certainly in the long run, a subsidy of 
$1 per gallon of biodiesel did not provide consistent profits in early periods observed. 
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This may help explain part of the bias in favor of corn. Quite simply, corn ethanol was 
closer to commercial viability than biodiesel. 
 Another reason for favoring corn is that soybeans produce both meal and oil 
whereas corn provides ethanol and a feed substitute for corn. Any demand-driven 
increase in soy oil prices will not translate directly into increases in soybean prices 
because the demand for soy meal is not affected. In fact, as we will show, relatively small 
removals of soybean oil from the food chain lead to an increase in soy oil prices rather 
than soybean prices, thus restricting the ability of the biodiesel industry to grow and the 
ability of policy to drive up soybean prices.  
 Figure 3 shows indices of actual corn and soy oil prices from 1984 to 2005 and 
graphs this index against the fuel value of the biofuel minus its feedstock cost. This later 
value is a proxy for the non-subsidized profitability of the biofuel industries. Most of 
these values are negative in the case of ethanol while all are negative for biodiesel. Thus, 
the figure shows that in the absence of subsidies, neither industry would have added 
much value to the feedstock by converting it to fuel. As the prices of corn increased along 
the horizontal axis, the profitability of ethanol production fell. The same is true for 
soybean oil prices, but the rate at which profits declined is greater than that for ethanol. 
These historical data show that it is more difficult to translate a demand increase for 
soybean oil into an increase in soybean prices via biodiesel than it is to translate an 
increase in demand for corn for ethanol into corn prices. Relatively small changes in 
soybean oil prices would rapidly choke off the growth of biodiesel production without 
necessarily increasing the price of soybeans. In fact, it may even be true that the most 
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effective way to increase soybean prices is to divert land into energy production via corn 
and then let the cross-elasticity of supply increase soybean prices. 
 
“Correct” Subsidy Schedules 
If we assume that the primary objective of biofuel subsidies is to remove land from food 
and feed production but now overlay that objective with a secondary objective of 
reducing net fuel use or GHG emissions (goals that are explicitly stated in the 2007 
energy act), we can calculate the new subsidy levels that achieve these secondary 
objectives while maintaining the primary objective. 
 Table 8 shows the blenders credit that equalizes the payment for the external 
benefit that is provided assuming that the subsidy of $0.51 per gallon currently provided 
for corn-based ethanol is the proper amount. The overall level of spending resulting from 
a base level of $0.51 per gallon from corn is presumably justified on the grounds of farm 
income support. Using the GHG emission reductions as a target, ethanol plants that use 
natural gas are underpaid relative to the average plant. The current subsidy structure, in 
general, under-pays ethanol plants that market their co-products in wet form. Notice also 
that the equivalent subsidy under a GHG target would entail a tax of $0.07 per gallon of 
ethanol produced in coal-fired plants that market DDGS. If the purpose of the policy is to 
achieve petroleum energy displacements and to transfer money to crop growers and 
landowners, then the subsidy scheme in the fourth column of table 8 is correct. This 
subsidy system is close to the existing policy and would require a very minor downward 
adjustment in the subsidy for soy-based biodiesel. 
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Inferred Weights of Secondary Objectives 
Keeping the same assumptions, we may infer the weights that policymakers assign to 
each of the two secondary objectives. We make use of the benefits in terms of petroleum 
energy and GHG emission reductions from table 5 (denoted here by rpet and rGHG, 
respectively), and then assign coefficients (wpet, wGHG) that would yield current subsidy 
levels (s). Formally, the following system of equations should hold:   
 ,i ipet pet GHG GHG ir w r w s⋅ + ⋅ =  where i = 1, …, n 
denotes the subsidized biofuel systems. 
 Since current policy ignores the differences among ethanol production paths, the 
system of equations narrows down to two equations only: current ethanol and soy oil 
biodiesel. Therefore, the two inferred coefficients can be deduced easily. Although the 
different units prevent a direct comparison, we can safely claim that the coefficients7 
imply that policymakers value 1 g of carbon dioxide as high as 6.3 Btu of petroleum. In 
other words, each cent of subsidy is currently buying a reduction of 1 g of carbon or 
equivalently 6.3 Btu of petroleum reduction.  
 Next, we use these coefficients to extrapolate the appropriate subsidy that would 
weigh the two benefits the same across all biofuel systems. The sixth column of table 8 
presents a suggested schedule in line with current subsidy rates and the coefficients 
implied by the stated objectives of the 2007 energy act. First, this schedule would make 
subsidies for corn-based ethanol vary in a range of $0.12 per gallon among different 
production paths. Secondly, the compensation for switchgrass-based ethanol needs to be 
$0.20 higher than its current rate according to the coefficients implied by current biofuel 
policy. Interestingly enough, computing the subsidy on a per acre basis subject to the 
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proposed schedule shows that switchgrass might be subsidized as high as corn under 
these terms. The 2007 energy act mandates an RFS that depends heavily on cellulosic 
biofuels, but it does not provide an incentive high enough for farmers to plant cellulosic 
crops. Our proposed schedule provides stimulus for planting switchgrass in conjunction 
with the (inferred) amount that society is willing to pay for its benefits. 
 
Conclusions 
U.S. biofuel policies evolved in a period of high energy price volatility, increasing 
climate change awareness, and substantial technological advances, and yet these policies 
have been very stable and have enjoyed enormous political support. These policies have 
greatly favored the construction of corn-based ethanol plants. This paper attempts to 
examine the source of this political support by examining the four reasons that have been 
put forward to justify existing policies and by asking whether the structures of the 
policies are consistent with those stated objectives. We are able to show that the 
structures of the policies would be very different if the primary objective was a reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions. We also find that if the primary purpose of the policies was 
to reduce dependence on foreign oil then funds would have been far more efficiently 
spent on green coal technologies. There is strong evidence to suggest that the primary 
purpose of these polices was to remove land from food and feed production and in so 
doing to increase farmers’ and landowners’ incomes.  
 Corn-based ethanol subsidies were favored (and introduced first) because corn-
based ethanol was far closer to commercialization than cellulosic ethanol or biodiesel at 
the time. Therefore, funds spent on this industry could be expected to have the greatest 
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influence on corn demand and crop prices. Corn-based ethanol subsidies also had the 
advantage of translating directly into higher corn prices, and higher crop prices in 
general, than would have been the case with soy-oil-based biodiesel. This conclusion 
follows because it is difficult to increase soybean prices by stimulating demand for soy 
oil. The additional soybeans needed would depress soybean meal markets, causing the 
biodiesel industry to choke off its own feedstock market without stimulating a supply 
response. 
 Evidence from the recent literature and commodity prices suggest that biofuel 
policies have achieved their primary implied objective and have allowed large income 
transfers to crop growers and landowners. The signing of the 2007 energy act and the 
likely participation of the United States in a global carbon emission reduction treaty has 
recently stimulated interest in the use of biofuel policy to reduce carbon emissions. This 
paper calculates two sets of alternative biofuel subsidies that are targeted to meet income 
transfer objectives and either GHG emission reductions or fuel energy reductions. The 
first of these assumes that GHG emissions and high crop prices are joint objectives while 
the second assumes that fuel independence and high crop prices are the joint objectives.  
 Inferred weights of secondary objectives are the grounds for a proposed subsidy 
schedule that is consistent with the primary objective and maintains current social 
preferences. This schedule provides higher credit to biofuel systems that generate larger 
positive externalities and additionally enhances the economic incentives to produce 
cellulosic ethanol.  
21 
Endnotes 
 
 
1 GREET stands for Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation. The 
model has been developed since 1995 at Argonne National Laboratory. The model, with over 3,500 
registered users worldwide, has been used extensively by governmental agencies, energy companies, 
universities and research institutions, automotive companies, and non-governmental organizations (Wang, 
Wu, and Huo, 2007). 
2 The British thermal unit (BTU or Btu) is a unit of energy used in the United States, particularly in the 
power, steam generation, and heating and air conditioning industries. The term “Btu” is used to describe the 
heat value (energy content) of fuels, and also to describe the power of heating and cooling systems, such as 
furnaces, stoves, barbecue grills, and air conditioners. The unit “mBtu” was originally defined as one 
thousand Btu presumably from the Roman numeral system where “M” stands for one thousand (1,000). In 
this article, we use the term “mBtu” to indicate one million Btu, reflecting the more modern usage of this 
term (source: Wikipedia). 
3 See <http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/market/data/daily.jsf>. 
4 See <http://www.nymex.com/ng_fut_csf.aspx?product=NG>. 
5See <http://www.angtl.com/pdfs/GREENCOAL.pdf>. 
6 To calculate this value directly from their paper, subtract the 8,972 value for direct jobs in table 2 (the 
low-ethanol-production scenario) from the 14,971 value for direct jobs in table 3 (the high-ethanol-
production scenario). 
7 6E-6 for each Btu of petroleum and 3.75E-2 for each kg of carbon reductions. 
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Table 1. Summary of Fuel Pathways Analyzed 
Ethanol Corn Current average production 80%DMa 
20%WM 
  2010 average production 87.5%DM    
12.5%WM 
  Natural Gas with DDGSb 100%DM 
  Natural Gas with WDGSb 100%DM 
  Coal with DDGS 100%DM 
  Coal with WDGS 100%DM 
 Cellulosic  Corn stover  
  Switchgrass  
Biodiesel Soybean oil   
a DM (WM) denotes dry (wet) milling plants; 80% of the fuel for DM plants is from 
natural gas and 20% is from coal, while 60% of the fuel for WM plants is from natural 
gas and 40% is from coal.  
b DDGS is dried distillers grains with solubles (90% dry matter), and WDGS denotes 
wet distillers grains with solubles (30%-35% dry matter).  
 
Table 2. Well-to-Wheels Fossil Energy Use (in Btu per mBtu of fuel produced), and 
Associated Reduction in Fossil Energy Consumption Relative to Gasoline or Diesel 
Fuel Technology/ 
Feedstock 
WTP PTW WTW Reduction 
  Btu/mBtu Btu/mBtu Btu/mBtu vs. gas/diesel 
Gasoline Current 225,641 1,000,000 1,225,641 - 
 Future 225,641 1,000,000 1,225,641 - 
Avg. EtoH Current 769,231 0 769,231 37.2% 
 Future 764,103 0 764,103 37.7% 
New EtoH NG-DDGS 728,205 0 728,205 40.6% 
 NG-WDGS 579,487 0 579,487 52.7% 
 Coal-DDGS 830,769 0 830,769 32.2% 
 Coal-WDGS 635,897 0 635,897 48.1% 
Cellulosic EtoH Switchgrass 102,564 0 102,564 91.6% 
 Corn Stovera 110,308 0 110,308 91.0% 
Dieselb  221,883 1,000,000 1,221,883 - 
Biodiesel Soybean oilb 529,978 0 529,978 56.6% 
Source: Figure 6 in Wang, Wu, and Huo (2007).  
a From Wu, Wang, and Huo (2006). 
b This study. 
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Table 3. Well-to-Wheels Petroleum Energy Use of Various Fuels in Btu per Million 
Btu of Fuel Produced and Used, and Associated Reduction in Fossil Energy 
Consumption Relative to Gasoline or Diesel 
Fuel Technology/ 
Feedstock 
WTP PTW WTW Reduction 
  Btu/mBtu Btu/mBtu Btu/mBtu vs. gas./diesel 
Gasoline Current 110,000 1,000,000 1,110,000 - 
 Future 110,000 1,000,000 1,110,000 - 
Avg. EtoH Current 100,000 0 100,000 91.0% 
 Future 90,000 0 90,000 91.9% 
New EtoH NG-DDGS 85,000 0 85,000 92.3% 
 NG-WDGS 85,000 0 85,000 92.3% 
 Coal-DDGS 90,000 0 90,000 91.9% 
 Coal-WDGS 90,000 0 90,000 91.9% 
Cellulosic EtoH Switchgrass 70,000 0 70,000 93.7% 
 Corn Stovera 66,600 0 66,600 94.0% 
Dieselb  112,196  1,000,000 1,112,196 - 
Biodiesel Soybean oilb 129,377 0 129,377 88.4% 
Source: Figure 8 in Wang, Wu, and Huo (2007).  
a From Wu, Wang, and Huo (2006).  
b This study. 
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Table 4. Well-to-Wheels GHG Emissions of Various Fuels in CO2-
Equivalent Grams per Million Btu of Fuel Produced and Used, and 
Percent Reduction Compared to Current Gasoline or Diesel 
Fuel Technology/ 
Feedstock 
WTW Emission 
Reduction 
  g CO2-eq/mBtu  
Gasoline Current 99,130 - 
 Future 99,130 - 
Avg. EtoH Current 80,000 19.1% 
 Future 78,261 20.9% 
New EtoH NG-DDGS 71,304 27.8% 
 NG-WDGS 60,870 38.3% 
 Coal-DDGS 101,739 -2.6% 
 Coal-WDGS 80,870 18.3% 
Cellulosic EtoH Switchgrass 14,783 84.3% 
 Corn Stovera 13,878 86.0% 
Dieselb  100,302 - 
Biodiesel Soybean oilb 40,521 59.6% 
Source: Figure 11 in Wang, Wu, and Huo (2007).  
a From Wu, Wang, and Huo (2006).  
b This study. 
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Table 5. Well-to-Wheels Benefits Provided per Gallon of Biofuels 
Produced and Used Replacing Gasoline or Diesel 
Fuel Technology/ 
Feedstock 
Fossil 
Energy 
Reduction
Petroleum 
Energy 
Reduction
GHG 
Emission 
Reduction 
  Btu/gal Btu/gal Kg/gal 
Avg. EtoH Current 34,687 76,760 1.45 
 Future 35,077 77,520 1.59 
New EtoH NG-DDGS 37,805 77,900 2.11 
 NG-WDGS 49,108 77,900 2.91 
 Coal-DDGS 30,010 77,520 -0.20 
 Coal-WDGS 44,821 77,520 1.39 
Cellulosic EtoH Switchgrass 85,354 79,040 6.41 
 Corn Stover 84,765 79,298 6.48 
Biodiesel Soybean oil 85,796 121,869 7.41 
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Table 6. Current Compensation Provided by the Blenders Credit to 
Services Provided by Different Systems 
Fuel Technology/ 
Feedstock 
Fossil 
Energy 
Reduction
Petroleum 
Energy 
Reduction
GHG 
Emission 
Reduction 
  $/mBtu $/mBtu $/ton 
Avg. EtoH Current 14.7 6.6 350.8 
 Future 14.5 6.6 321.5 
New EtoH NG-DDGS 13.5 6.5 241.2 
 NG-WDGS 10.4 6.5 175.4 
 Coal-DDGS 17.0 6.6 -a 
 Coal-WDGS 11.4 6.6 367.5 
Cellulosic EtoH Switchgrass 6.0 6.5 79.6 
 Corn Stover 6.0 6.4 78.7 
Biodiesel Soybean oil 11.7 8.2 134.9 
a GHG emissions are increased compared to gasoline by using ethanol produced in a 
coal-fired plant that dries co-products (see table 5).  
 
 
Table 7. Assumptions to Obtain the Amount of Biofuels Produced by Acre of Land 
and the Payments That Would Result under the Current Scheme 
 Yields Biofuel Production 
gal/acre 
Current Subsidya 
$/acre 
Corn (bu/acre) 153 428 218.5 
Soybean (bu/acre) 45 63.1 63.1 
Corn Stover (kg/acre) 1600 112 57.1 
Switchgrass (kg/acre) 5,000 350 178.5 
Note: Yield assumptions: (a) the oil contents of soybeans is 18%, (b) 7.7 pounds of vegetable oil per gallon 
of biodiesel, (c) 2.8 gallon of ethanol per bushel of corn, (d) 70 gallons of ethanol per ton of cellulosic 
materials, (e) 40% of 4,000 kg per acre of corn stover can be sustainably collected (Kadam and McMillan, 
2003; Perlack and Turhollow, 2003).  
a Assumed to be fully passed to farmers. 
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Table 8. Subsidy Equivalent per Gallon for Different Pathways Based on the 
Services Provided Given the Current $0.51 Blenders Credit for any Given 
Gallon of Ethanol 
Fuel Technology/ 
Feedstock 
Fossil 
Energy 
Reduction
Petroleum 
Energy 
Reduction
GHG 
Emission 
Reduction 
Inferred 
Subsidy 
Schedule  
  $/gallon $/gallon $/gallon $/gallon 
Avg. EtoH Current 0.51  0.51  0.51  0.51 
 Future 0.52  0.52  0.56  0.52 
New EtoH NG-DDGS 0.56  0.52  0.74  0.54 
 NG-WDGS 0.72  0.52  1.02  0.57 
 Coal-DDGS 0.44  0.52  ‐0.07  0.45 
 Coal-WDGS 0.66  0.52  0.49  0.51 
Cellulosic EtoH Switchgrass 1.25  0.53  2.25  0.71 
 Corn Stover 1.25  0.53  2.27  0.71 
Biodiesel Soybean oil 1.26  0.81  2.60  1.00 
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Figure 1. Ethanol industry and corn yield trends 
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Sources: Constructed by authors based on Economic Research Service, Energy Information Administration, and 
National Agricultural Statistics Service data.  
 
Figure 2. Historical profit margins of biofuels 
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Figure 3. Fuel value and feedstock prices 
 
 
